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POLITICS AND PRINCIPLE: AN
ALTERNATIVE TAKE ON SETH P. WAXMAN'S
DEFENDING CONGRESS
NEAL DEVINS'

Two years ago, the North Carolina Law Review published
Defending Congress, an important essay by Clinton administration
Solicitor General Seth Waxman. 1 In explaining why the Clinton
administration defended most but not all federal statutes, Solicitor
General Waxman argued that principle, not politics or ideology,
drove his decisionmaking. In the pages that follow, I will take issue
with Waxman's characterization of Clinton-era decisionmakingespecially the
administration's decision to defend
the
Communications Decency Act of 1996 ("CDA") 2 but not 1968
legislation overriding Miranda v. Arizona. 3 In so doing, I will call
attention to how Waxman's neutral-sounding standard-that the
Solicitor General should defend laws whenever it is possible to
advance a "professionally respectable" argument that does not
require overruling constitutional precedent4-is susceptible to
* Goodrich Professor of Law, William & Mary Marshall-Wythe School of Law;
Professor of Government, The College of William & Mary. A.B., 1978, Georgetown
University; J.D., 1982, Vanderbilt University Law School. The title of this Essay borrows
from John 0. McGinnis, Principle Versus Politics: The Solicitor General's Office in
Constitutional and Bureaucratic Theory, 44 STAN. L. REV. 799 (1992). Thanks to Morgan
Frankel, John McGinnis, Tom Merrill, and Charles Tiefer for comments on an earlier
draft of this Essay. Thanks also to Harry Tashijan for help in collecting sources. Thanks,
finally, to Heyward Armstrong and his colleagues at the North Carolina Law Review for
encouraging me to write this Essay.
1. Seth P. Waxman, Defending Congress, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1073 (2001).
2. Pub. L. No. 104-104,110 Stat. 133 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 223(a) , (d)(h) (2000)) (criminally prohibiting use of the Internet to make "indecent" or "patently
offensive" material available to minors). The Supreme Court invalidated the statute in
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844,849 (1997).
3. 384 U.S. 436 (1966); see Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,
Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 701(a), 82 Stat. 197,210-11 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3501
(2000)) (substituting a "totality of the circumstances" test for so-called Miranda warnings).
The Supreme Court struck down this law in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428
(2000). For additional discussion, see infra notes 19-25 and accompanying text.
4. Waxman, supra note 1, at 1078, 1085. Waxman, however, would not have this
principle apply in separation of powers cases where Congress and the President "find
themselves at odds regarding the proper interpretation of their own, and each other's,
constitutional powers." /d. at 1084. This exception (which I will not assess in this Essay)
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political or ideological manipulation. Correspondingly, I will explain
why Waxman had little incentive to defend Clinton-era
decisionmaking as an appropriate exercise of his and/or the
President's power to independently interpret the Constitution. In
particular, such an explanation would neither preserve the Solicitor
General's status as a quasi-independent actor nor allow Waxman to
simultaneously explain both the soundness of his decisionmaking and
the wrongness of a successor Solicitor General (make that Ted Olson)
refusing to defend federal statutes that implicate Congress's power to
regulate interstate commerce, campaign finance, affirmative action,
and the like. 5 At the same time, I do not mean to suggest that
Defending Congress is a post hoc rationalization of politicized
decisionmaking. My aim, instead, is to call attention to how both
politics and personal belief stand in the way of any Solicitor General
implementing a predictable, neutral-sounding theory of when he will
and will not defend acts of Congress.
Before turning to the particulars of Waxman's essay, I think it
useful to articulate my understanding of the President's power to
interpret the Constitution. First and foremost, our tripartite system
of government assumes that the executive is independent from, not
To maintain that
subordinate to, Congress and the courts.
independence, a President must be able to decide for himself what the
Constitution means. By taking an oath to "faithfully execute" his
office and to "preserve, protect, and defend" the Constitution,6 a
President affirms that he will not act in violation of the
Constitution-even if that means refusing to defend the
constitutionality of legislation. For that very reason, the Clinton
administration was under no duty to enforce or defend Miranda
override legislation. 7
adheres to longstanding Justice Department practice. See generally Presidential Authority
to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, 18 Op. Office of Legal Couns. 199 (1994)
(discussing the President's constitutional authority to decline to execute unconstitutional
statutes).
5. See infra notes 41-42 and accompanying text (discussing Waxman's call for the
Bush administration to defend Congress's Commerce Clause power).
6. U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 1.
7. For a more detailed presentation of this argument, see Neal Devins, Asking the
Right Questions: How the Courts Honored the Separation of Powers by Reconsidering
Miranda, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 251, 270-74 (2000). For scholarship addressing the
President's power to interpret the Constitution, see Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential
Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905 (1990); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most
Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994).
For a competing perspective, see Charles Tiefer, The Constitutionality of Independent
Officers as Checks on Executive Abuse, 63 B.U. L. REV. 59, 90 (1983) (arguing that
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In saying that a President need not defend or execute a law he
thinks unconstitutional, I am not suggesting that the President is not
bound by the rule of law. Like Waxman, I think that the Solicitor
General has a "responsibility to account for the interests of all three
branches of government."8 For example, a President cannot place
himself above the Court by refusing to execute a judicial order, even
if he thinks the order is constitutionally infirm. Moreover, to allow
each branch to check the others, presidents-whenever possibleshould enforce constitutionally suspect legislation in order to set the
stage for a court challenge. 9
The question remains: Should Solicitor General filings before
the Supreme Court reflect the President's understanding of the
Constitution? In answering this question, Waxman contends that the
Solicitor General must maintain fidelity, not to the President, but to
the "rule of law" and, with it, the Supreme Court's "history of judicial
review." 10 Contending that "the Supreme Court has the final word on
the meaning of the Constitution," Waxman argues that the best way
to "honor the important doctrine of stare decisis" is to fence out cases
in which the Court would have to overrule one of its precedents from
the Solicitor General's normal practice of "[v]igorously defending
congressional legislation. " 11
In explaining the workings of this model, Waxman draws a
distinction between his defense of the CDA and his refusal to defend
Miranda override legislation. The CDA case, as Waxman recognizes,
was a sure loser. 12 Congress, "without hearings or committee
"faithful execution" does not include the President's power to refuse to implement
statutes he thinks unconstitutional).
8. Waxman, supra note 1, at 1078.
9. Unlike Waxman, I think that the Article III case or controversy requirement may
foreclose the executive from making arguments identical to the arguments made by the
party challenging executive branch enforcement. See Devins, supra note 7, at 277-79. As
such, presidents may not be able to enforce a law while arguing that it is unconstitutional.
For a general treatment of this issue, see Dawn E. Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement
of Constitutionally Objectionable Statutes, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2000,
at 7.
10. Waxman, supra note 1, at 1088, 1078.
11. /d. at 1085-86, 1078. Waxman also argues that, by defending the constitutionality
of federal laws, the Solicitor General gives "proper respect ... to Congress's policy
choices." /d. at 1078. Yet, by refusing to defend in some cases (even when "professionally
responsible" arguments can be made), it is clear that Waxman's principal allegiance is to
the Supreme Court (or at least Supreme Court precedent). For additional discussion, see
infra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
12. In addition to comments made in Defending Congress, Waxman had earlier
described the CDA as too much of "a blunt instrument" and Reno v. ACLU as "an easy
case." Nadine Strossen, Foreword, 15 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. i, viii-ix & n.23 (1998)
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consideration," imposed criminal penalties on "indecent" or "patently
offensive" speech available to children on the Internet. 13 All six
lower court judges that had ruled on the CDA found the law facially
unconstitutional "in every respect." 14 Consequently, while the CDA
is "an example some people chuckle to recall," Waxman sees it as an
exemplar of the Solicitor General's serving "our adversarial system of
constitutional adjudication" by articulating the "strongest possible
rationale in support of [the] constitutionality" of legislationY In
explaining his decision not to defend Miranda override legislation,
Waxman invokes another ideal: namely, his "obligation to honor"
stare decisis. 16 Contending that "the statute in question could not be
reconciled with Miranda, it could constitutionally be applied only if
the Court were to overrule Miranda," Waxman saw his refusal to
defend this statute as a way of maintaining "fidelity to the rule of
law. " 17
Upon closer examination, however, there is reason to question
this narrative. To start, Waxman overstates matters when arguing
that the only way he could have defended Miranda override
legislation was to ask the Justices to explicitly overrule their
"landmark" "constitutional" decision in Miranda. 18 When upholding
Miranda override statute, for example, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded that Miranda created
nonconstitutional, prophylactic rules, and, consequently, Congress
could override the decision without compelling the Court to overturn
a constitutional ruling. 19 Likewise, the attorney defending the statute
before the Court as well as the House General Counsel and a
coalition of Senators who filed amicus briefs in the case all argued
that the Miranda rules were not mandated by the Constitution.20 In
(discussing why "as President of the ACLU" she was "perturbed about the squandering of
our government's resources" in the defense of a law that the Justice Department thought
"'obviously unconstitutional' ")(internal quotation omitted).
13. Waxman, supra note 1, at 1079 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 223(d)(1)(B) (2000)) (internal
quotation omitted).
14. /d. (citing Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 922 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), affd, 521 U.S.
1113 (1997), and ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824,849 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 521 U.S. 844
(1997)).
15. /d.
16. !d. at 1085.
17. /d.at1088.
18. !d. at1087-88.
19. United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 684-92 (4th Cir. 1999), rev'd, 530 U.S.
428 (2000).
20. See Brief of Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae Urging Affirmance of the Judgment
Below at 5, Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (No. 99-5525); Brief Amicus
Curiae of the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the United States House of
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short, it appears as if a "professionally responsible" argument
defending the statute could have been made without calling upon the
Court to "overturn" one of its precedents.21 That argument would
have contended that prophylactic rules are not constitutional in
stature and, consequently, Congress is free to modify them, as it is
free to modify rules of federal common law.
That, of course, does not mean that that argument is either the
correct reading of Miranda or the Constitution. 22 It does suggest,
however, that the decision not to defend the statute is best explained
by Waxman's views of the Constitution's right against selfincrimination and/or Miranda. Indeed, in his certiorari petition
before the Court, Waxman argued that Miranda "promotes public
confidence that the criminal justice system is fair" and that "[s]teps
that may damage that confidence should not be taken lightly."23
Along these lines, there is reason to speculate that Waxman thought
the costs of the Solicitor General's backing Congress were too high.
In particular, when the Supreme Court agreed to hear the Miranda
override case, the New York Times and Legal Times spoke of
Miranda as "not without ambiguity" and predicted that "the decision
is likely to be close." 24 Consequently, rather than find himself an
important player in the undoing of Miranda, Waxman may have

Representatives in Support of Affirmance at 15, Dickerson (No. 99-5525); Brief Amicus
Curiae of Senators Orrin G. Hatch et al. Urging Affirmation at 6, Dickerson (No. 995525). On the other side (arguing that the statute could be sustained only if Miranda was
overruled), a brief written by Charles Tiefer and filed by the House Democratic
Leadership advanced arguments similar to those advanced in Waxman's brief for the
United States. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the House Democratic Leadership in Support
of Petitioner at 22, Dickerson (No. 99-5525). For additional discussion, see infra notes 2125 and accompanying text.
21. Indeed, Waxman's decision not to defend appears at odds with his claim that the
Solicitor General, in order to defend a constitutionally suspect act of Congress, often
"lean[s] heavily on the Ashwander principle of construing a statute so as to avoid
constitutional doubt." Waxman, supra note 1, at 1079-80 (citing Ashwander v. TV A, 297
u.s. 288,348 (1936)).
22. Along these lines, it is possible that Waxman would have defended a statute that
embraced a different view of the Miranda decision. For example, it is possible that
Waxman would have defended a statute specifying that the remedy for a violation of
Miranda should be money damages (not the exclusion of evidence). That type of statute
would not have questioned whether the Court's comments about the inherently coercive
nature of custodial interrogations were, ultimately, a proposition of constitutional law.
Thanks to Tom Merrill for pointing this out to me.
23. Brief for the United States at 36, Dickerson (No. 99-5525).
24. Linda Greenhouse, Justices to Hear Case that Tests Miranda Decision, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 7,1999, at Al; Tony Mauro, Justices Debate Miranda, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 24,
2000, at 9.
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thought it best to try to undo Congress's handiwork by advancing his
views about Miranda. 25
Waxman's defense of the CDA can also be recast. 26 Rather than
exemplifying the Solicitor General's willingness to defend
constitutionally suspect legislation, the CDA defense may be tied to
United States v. Knox,27 a political debacle involving first term Clinton
Solicitor General Drew Days. Knox raised the issue of whether a
1984 child pornography law applied to photographs of young girls
dressed in scanty appareJ.28 The (first) Bush administration had
successfully argued that the law did apply to such photos. But after
the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case, Solicitor General
Days "confessed error" and, in so doing, joined forces with the
American Civil Liberties Union in arguing that the Bush
interpretation was incorrect. Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court
remanded Knox to the Third Circuit and, as Solicitor General Days
put it, "all hell broke loose." 29 All one hundred senators voted for a
resolution condemning the Solicitor General's brief, and a 1994 crime
bill included a section expressing Congress's sense that the 1984 law,
in fact, did apply to children wearing scanty appareP° For his part,
the President released a letter to Attorney General Reno agreeing
with "the Senate about what the proper scope of the child
pornography law should be." 31 And finally, when the Knox case
returned to the Supreme Court, the Clinton Department of Justice (in
a brief signed by Attorney General Reno) shifted its position and
argued in favor of a broad interpretation of the 1984law.32

25. President Clinton backed Waxman's decision not to defend the Miranda override
statute. See Tony Mauro, Seth Waxman's Supreme Confidence, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 23,
2000, at 12, 14 (describing the White House meeting between President Clinton, Attorney
General Reno, and Solicitor General Waxman).
26. Technically, the decision to defend the CDA was made by then-Acting Solicitor
General Walter Dellinger. Waxman, however, did argue the case before the Court and
refers to that argument in Defending Congress. See Waxman, supra note 1, at 1079.
27. 776 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Pa. 1991), affd, 977 F.2d 815 (3d Cir. 1992), dismissed,
vacated, and remanded, 510 U.S. 939 (1993).
28. Knox , 766 F. Supp. at 179-80.
29. DrewS. Days, III, When the President Says "No ": A Few Thoughts on Executive
Power and the Tradition of Solicitor Genera/Independence, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS
509,515 (2001) (internal quotation omitted).
30. See 139 CONG. REC. 29,568-70 (1993) (statements of Sen. Roth and Sen.
Grassley); Linda Greenhouse, Court Rejects Appeal of Man Convicted in Child Smut Case
With Political Overtones, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1995, at D20.
31. Stuart Taylor, Jr., Demagoging Kidporn: Justice Gets Bad Rap, LEGAL TIMES,
Nov. 29, 1993, at 26 (quoting the Clinton letter).
32. See Pierre Thomas, Reno Takes Tougher Stance on Child Pornography, WASH .
POST, Nov. 11 , 1994, at A3.
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Against this backdro11, it is Fttle wonder that Waxman might
have had no taste for a starring role in "Son of Knox." Moreover,
unlike Miranda override legislation, there was little prospect of a
Solicitor General brief and oral argument supporting the CDA
materially affecting the outcome of the litigation. I do not mean to
suggest here that the only reason Waxman defended the CDA was
because he feared political backlash. 33 At the same time, the standard
he articulates is easily manipulable. For another Solicitor General,
Miranda override legislation could have been defended without
calling for the outright reversal of Miranda. Likewise, the CDA was
seen as a sure loser because the Court would have had to overrule or
reinterpret past precedent to uphold the statute. And if that is the
case, another Solicitor General could have concluded that the CDA
could not be defended without asking the Court to overrule a
constitutional precedent.34
Indeed, Waxman concedes that it is sometimes permissible for
the Solicitor General to ask the Court to overrule past precedent.
But he never explains when that is appropriate. For example, if the
Truman administration was right in calling for the overruling of
Plessy v. Ferguson, 35 was the Reagan administration also correct in
calling for the overruling of Roe v. Wade? 36 And if not, why not? 37

33. The Clinton Department of Justice may have hoped the Court would recalibrate
its doctrine and uphold the CDA. Under this scenario, of course, Waxman would have
strong incentive to launch a vigorous defense of the CD A.
34. Along these very lines, Waxman explained his predecessor's decision not to
defend federal legislation that gave special treatment to nursing services " 'operated, or
listed and certified, by the First Church of Christ, Scientist, Boston, Massachusetts.' "
Waxman, supra note 1, at 1080 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(e) (1994)). In particular, even
though the Civil Division had "fought valiantly in the district court" by trying to defend
the statute as consistent with existing precedent, the Solicitor General thought that he
"could not continue to advocate the statute's constitutionality" without asking the Court
to overturn Establishment Clause precedents. /d. at 1081.
35. 163 u.s. 537 (1896).
.
36. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). For a general treatment of the Reagan administration's call
for the Supreme Court to overturn Roe, see CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW 71-88
(1991 ).
37. Waxman never makes clear whether his embrace of stare decisis applies only to
constitutional challenges to federal legislation or, alternatively, whether he thinks that the
Solicitor General should not call for the overruling of earlier precedents. His essay, of
course, is about the rules governing the defense of federal statutes. At the same time, his
comments about stare decisis seem more generalizable. For example, Waxman refers to
the Truman administration's call for the overruling of Plessy (in a case that did not
implicate a federal statute) to be the exception that "prove[s] the general rule" that the
Solicitor General must exercise "extreme restraint" before calling for the overruling of
constitutional precedent. Waxman, supra note 1, at 1087. Waxman, however, never
squares this suggestion with his apparent embrace of a conflicting proposition-that is,
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Moreover, what does it mean_ to say that the Solicitor General can
only make "professionally responsible" arguments? Waxman never
explains how he would draw the line separating a responsible
argument from an irresponsible one.
From my vantage point, Defending Congress is better used to
explain past decisionmaking than it is to predict future
decisionmaking. This does not mean that Solicitor General Waxman
placed his personal beliefs ahead of his stated commitment to the
"rule of law"; instead, Waxman may have thought he was fairly
applying the principles enunciated in Defending Congress. 38
Nevertheless, I cannot help but notice how Waxman's essay is a
template both for maintaining the power and prestige of the Solicitor
General and for limiting the ability of future Solicitors General to
advance the social conservative agenda by calling either for the
overruling of disfavored precedents or the Court's invalidation of
disfavored federal statutes.
Let me explain. First, the 2000 elections were lurking in the
background of Defending Congress, which was drawn from a
September 15, 2000, address. At that time, Waxman was well aware
of differences between "[s]trong conservatives" and "moderates and
By
liberals" on, for example, "the federal-state balance." 39
contending that "the Solicitor General must be the steward and
champion of Congress's legislative judgments,"40 Waxman suggests
that it would be professionally irresponsible for the current
administration to refuse to defend federal statutes by invoking states'
rights values. 41 Moreover, by tying his proposal to the sanctity of the
"rule of law" and, with it, stare decisis, Waxman did more than
that the President has the power to independently interpret the Constitution. See id. at
1078-79 n.14.
38. Consider, for example, Waxman's October 13, 1999, refusal to defend an
abrogation provision in federal copyright law. See Letter from Janet Reno, Attorney
General, to Albert Gore, Jr., President of the Senate (Oct. 13, 1999) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review). Here, Waxman's decision can only be understood as a good
faith effort to put into effect a 1999 Supreme Court ruling invalidating an analogous
federal patent statute. In other words, in calling attention to how politics or ideology
might play a role in the implementation of the model advanced by Solicitor General
Waxman, I am not arguing that Waxman's decisionmaking, in fact, was animated by
politics or ideology. See supra p. 2062, infra p. 2072-73 (repeating this assertion).
39. Seth P. Waxman, Foreword: Does the Solicitor General Matter?, 53 STAN. L. REV.
1115, 1126 (2001) (adapted from remarks delivered on February 4, 2001 ).
40. /d.
41. Indeed, Waxman closed his February 4, 2001, address on whether "the Solicitor
General matters" by remarking: "Let us watch very carefully how my successor answers
those questions" on whether he will do his duty and place the national interest ahead of
(what may well be) his personal beliefs. /d.
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provide a rationale for his decision not to defend Miranda override
legislation. He also sent a message that it would be wrong for the
Bush administration to call for the overturning of Supreme Court
decisions on abortion, school prayer, affirmative action, and the like. 42
Second (and far more important), Defending Congress's claims
about the Solicitor General's "obligation to honor the important
doctrine of stare decisis" 43 are not simply a benchmark that
bootstraps the current administration; these claims also speak to the
Solicitor General's quasi-independent status and, correspondingly,
the wrongness of either Congress or the President seeking to
influence Solicitor General decisionmaking.
Likewise, without
explicitly mentioning the controversy surrounding Reagan and (first)
Bush-era Solicitors General conforming to administration policy and
calling for the overruling of Roe, Waxman seems well aware of the
benefits of insulating the Solicitor General from the burly-burly of
politics. 44
Political insulation, however, cannot be achieved with a stump
speech describing the Solicitor General as a "serv[ant]" to "his
country" whose responsibility is "to account for the interests of all
three branches of government."45 More to the point, Congress is
likely to leave the Solicitor General alone so long as the Solicitor
General is sensitive to Congress's needs. 46 By defending nearly all
federal statutes, Solicitors General are able to both earn Congress's
trust and protect their turf. 47
42. For additional discussion, see John 0. McGinnis, Principle Versus Politics: The
Solicitor General's Office in Constitutional and Bureaucratic Theory, 44 STAN. L. REV.
799,811-12 (1992) (contending that lawyers who work in the Solicitor General's office are
apt to embrace Warren Court liberalism).
43. Waxman, supra note 1, at 1085-86.
44. For an argument that the Solicitor General should represent the President's
interests, see McGinnis, supra note 42. For an argument (quite similar to Waxman's) that
the Solicitor General's duty is to the rule of law, see LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH
JUSTICE (1987).
45. Waxman, supra note 1, at 1088,1078.
46. Perhaps because counsel for the House and Senate stand ready to defend-on
separation of powers grounds-the constitutionality of federal statutes, Congress is
accepting of the Justice Department's refusal to defend statutes on separation of powers
grounds. See Charles Tiefer, The Senate and House Counsel Offices: Dilemmas of
Representing in Court the Institutional Congressional Client, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Spring 1998, at 47, 50-55. In making this point, I am not suggesting that federal courts
ought to ignore Article III justiciability constraints in order to allow the President and
Congress to advance conflicting constitutional interpretations. See Devins, supra note 7,
at 277-79 (arguing that INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), was nonjusticiable for
precisely this reason).
47. Solicitors General, moreover, must signal their willingness to defend federal
statutes in order to secure Senate confirmation. This was true for Waxman and, more
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In addition to th,ese. So~icitor pel1eraJ-specific concerns, the
President and the Attorney General too have strong incentives to
work with Congress. 48 Congress can pressure the executive through
any one of a number of techniques, including the power to confirm
nominees; cut off funds to the. Ju~tice Department and other
executive agencies; subject Justice Department officials to oversight
hearings and other types of jawboning; and finally, shift litigation
authority away from the Justice Department (and the concomitant
power to shift government operations away from the executive and to
independent agencies). Against this backdrop, it is little wonder that
the President and Attorney General almost always want the Justice
Department to defend the constitutionality of legislation.
In
particular, by accommodating Congress in this way, the President and
Attorney General get something in return: peace-that is, lawmaker
acquiescence to Justice Department control of litigation, especially
Supreme Court litigation.49
Consider, for example, the Clinton administration's flip-flop in
the Knox litigation. Recognizing the costs of advancing a narrow
definition of child pornography laws, the President and Attorney
General disavowed Solicitor General Days's arguments and, in so
doing, placated Congress. 50 Likewise, in Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 51
the (first) Bush administration took Congress's support of race
preferences into account. Specifically, in an effort both to get the
Senate to confirm his three picks for the Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC") and to otherwise establish a good working
relationship between the Commission and its congressional overseers,
the President nominated Commissioners who supported diversity
recently, for Solicitor General Ted Olson. For example, in discussing campaign finance
reform legislation, then-nominee Ted Olson remarked that "the fact that the President
might have expressed some doubts doesn't alleviate the Justice Department from its
responsibility to do everything it can within reason to defend the constitutionality of the
statute." Confirmation Hearing on the Nominations of Larry D. Thompson to be Deputy
Attorney General and Theodore B. Olson to be Solicitor General of the United States,
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 127 (2001) (statement of Ted
Olson) (Sup. Doc. No. Y4.J89/2:S.HRG.107-250).
48. A more detailed presentation of the argument laid out in this paragraph can be
found in Neal Devins, Defending Congress's Interests in Court: How Lawmakers and the
President Bargain Over Department of Justice Representation, 32 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q.
157, 160-65 (2002).
49. For an explanation of why the President supports the centralization of litigation
authority in the Justice Department, see Neal Devins & Michael Herz, The Battle That
Never Was: Congress, the White House, and Agency Litigation Authority, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1998, at 205, 219-20.
50. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
51. 497 u.s. 547 (1990).
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preferences. 52 Correspondingly, J ev~n though: the· administration
thought these preferences were unconstitutional, the Solicitor
General let the FCC defend their constitutionality before the
Supreme Court (allowing the administration to attack the preference
program as an amicus without risking the case's dismissal on
mootness grounds).53 In these and other ways, the President,
Attorney General, and Solicitor General seek to maintain goodwill
with Congress by accommodating lawmaker preferences.
What, then, of Solicitor General Waxman's decision not to
defend Miranda override legislation? Here, the Solicitor General was
well aware of Congress's interest in the statute. Oversight hearings
had been held in 1995 and 1997; at that time, Solicitor General Days
and Attorney General Reno were both asked about the Justice
Department's willingness to utilize Miranda override legislation. 54 At
the same time, the Clinton administration almost certainly knew that
Democrats in Congress did not support the 1968 Miranda override
legislation. House Democratic leadership, for example, filed a brief
extolling Miranda's "extraordinary history of acceptance and success
in federal law enforcement" and otherwise calling for the
reaffirmation of Miranda. 55 In other words, unlike the Knox litigation
(where Congress spoke as one), Miranda override litigation required
the Clinton administration to choose sides in a contested battle. It
therefore is hardly surprising that the President, Attorney General,
and Solicitor General would decide not to defend the
constitutionality of Miranda override legislation. 56

52. See Neal Devins, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Requiem for a Heavyweight,
69 TEX. L. REV. 125, 152-53 & n.181 (1990).
53. For a more detailed discussion of the politics behind the Metro Broadcasting
litigation, see Neal Devins, Unitariness and Independence: Solicitor General Control of
Independent Agency Litigation, 82 CAL. L. REV. 255 (1994).
54. See Oversight of the Department of Justice: Hearing Before the Comm. on the
Judiciary on Oversight on the Operations of the Department of Justice, 105th Cong. 71-72
(2000) (questioning of Attorney General Reno by Senator Jeff Sessions (R-AJa.) on the
Miranda override legislation) (Sup. Doc. No. Y4.J89/2:S.HRG105-1041); Solicitor General
Oversight: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary on Examining the Operation and
Activities of the Office of the Solicitor General of the Department of Justice, 104th Cong.
29-33 (1997) (Sup. Doc. No. Y4.J89/2:SHRG.104-818) (questioning of Solicitor General
Days by Senator Fred Thompson (R-Tenn.) on the government's position regarding
Congress's ability to make laws which override Miranda).
55. Brief Amicus Curiae of the House Democratic Leadership at 5, Dickerson v.
United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (No. 99-5525). While this brief was filed after the
Clinton administration's decision, it seems likely that the administration knew that
Democrats in Congress would support their decision.
56. See Mauro, supra note 24.
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Likewise, it is not surprising that •Waxman would pitch his
decision not to defend Miranda override legislation as grounded in
the Solicitor General's "obligation to honor" stare decisis and, with it,
the rule of law. 57 From the standpoint of Solicitor General-Congress
relations, this type of defense (which may well reflect Waxman's
reading of Miranda) is less vulnerable to political attack than a
defense grounded in the Solicitor General's understanding of
presidential desires, good public policy, or even the Constitution's
meaning. In particular, a defense grounded in stare decisis looks to
what the Court thinks, not what the Solicitor General and/or
President thinks. Correspondingly, such a defense communicates to
Congress that the Solicitor General can still be looked to as a
vigorous advocate of legislation, for he will not place his or the
President's views ahead of Congress's. 58
From the standpoint of Solicitor General-White House relations,
Waxman also had good reason to speak about his obligations to
Congress and the Court. The Solicitor General's reputation for
professionalism and independence is tied to the notion that his
allegiances run outside of the executive branch to the Supreme Court
and, more generally, to the rule of law. More to the point: The
power of the Solicitor General is tied to his reputation for
independence. Accordingly, the Solicitor General has little incentive
to refuse to defend an act of Congress, especially when such a
decision places his office on the sidelines and opens him up to charges
of acting politically. Instead, by seeing himself both as an officer of
the Court and an advocate for all parts of the government, the
Solicitor General maximizes influence with both the Supreme Court
and other parts of the government.
I do not mean to suggest that Waxman does not see the Solicitor
General as a quasi-independent advocate; my suspicion is that
Waxman truly believes what he says. I also suspect that Waxman
finds his theory irresistible, in part, because it protects the
independence of his office, provides a neutral-sounding justification
for his decisionmaking in the Miranda override litigation, and can be

57. Waxman, supra note 1, at 1085, 1088.
58. Along these lines, Supreme Court Justices will interpret a decision to defend an
act of Congress as a procedural decision grounded in respect for Congress's policymaking
powers and the Court's authority to rule on the constitutionality of federal legislation. In
contrast, Justices-assuming they buy Waxman's theory-will interpret a decision not to
defend an act of Congress as a substantive evaluation that the Solicitor General could not
utilize existing Supreme Court precedent to advance a "professionally responsible"
argument.
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used to attack social conservatives who want the Solicitor General to
advance their agenda before the Supreme Court. 59 That this theory is
also subject to political and ideological manipulation speaks to a
larger point about whether the Solicitor · General, in fact, can be
bound by a predictable, neutral-sounding theory.
Whether or not he sees himself as a political actor, the Solicitor
General must operate in a political world. By necessity, he must
juggle numerous balls and otherwise engage in a complex balancing
act. On high profile cases, the Solicitor General cannot help but
notice Congress, the White House, agency heads, the Attorney
General and division heads within the Department of Justice,
careerist lawyers in his office, the press, legal academics, and other
elites. More than that, the Solicitor General knows that his
effectiveness may well be measured by his won-lost record before the
Supreme Court-as well as his ability to insulate his office from direct
political influence. Waxman is no doubt well aware of the difficulties
of balancing competing interests and successfully advancing an
agenda before the Supreme Court. In other writings, he effectively
discusses how "context and advocacy" can and should affect Solicitor
General decisionmaking. 60 Against this backdrop, there is little to
commend a predictable monolithic theory.
Solicitor General Waxman, no doubt, understands this;
Defending Congress advances a theory that at once sounds highly
principled but nevertheless can be manipulated to accommodate
political reality and personal belief. Indeed, although there is no
59. This suspicion is grounded in my belief that people of integrity often employ
"motivated reasoning"-the notion that individuals will embrace reasoning "strategies"
consistent with their "desire[s] or preferences." Christopher H. Schroeder, Causes of the
Recent Turn in Constitutional Interpretation, 51 DUKE L.J. 307, 351-59 (2001) (quoting
Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480, 480 (1990)).
60. Waxman, supra note 39, at 1126 (discussing ongoing federalism litigation and
noting that "we are at a delicate point in the Commerce Clause journey" which may be
very much affected by the Solicitor General's actions). Also, in a wonderful essay on
Supreme Court advocacy, Waxman demonstrates his awareness of how politics and
context impacted the Solicitor General's defense of New Deal legislation. See Seth P.
Waxman, The Physics of Persuasion: Arguing the New Deal, 88 GEO. L.J. 2399, 2399
(2000). For this very reason, Waxman argues that the Roosevelt administration should
have focused its energies on the pursuit of winnable cases-even if that meant that the
administration would not defend some of its regulatory schemes and (for some period of
time) related congressional legislation. See id. at 2405-07 (discussing the wrongness of
appealing United States v. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp., 76 F.2d 617 (2d Cir. 1935),
rev'd, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)). For a general treatment of how the Solicitor General uses his
power to select cases to shape Supreme Court doctrine, see Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L.
Spitzer, The Government Litigant Advantage: Implications for the Law, 28 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 391 (2000).
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reason to think that Waxman does not sincerely believe everything he
says in Defending Congress, it is nevertheless striking that his
argument simultaneously justifies his decisionmaking, protects the
Office of Solicitor General from political attack, and furthers his
desire to constrain Solicitor General Olson from advancing
arguments he dislikes. 61 For all these reasons, Waxman's argument
should be greeted with awe as well as skepticism. And while this
Essay has invested most of its energy in suggesting that there is
reason to be skeptical when reading Defending Congress, Waxman
deserves credit for writing a plausible and entertaining essay explicitly
defending his tenure as Solicitor General and implicitly limiting the
Bush administration in its efforts to use the Solicitor General's office
to advance the social conservative agenda. 62

61. On this last point, see Waxman, supra note 39, at 1126 (noting that with regard to
federalism, the Solicitor General acts as "the steward and champion of Congress's
legislative judgments and [in] the long-term institutional interests of the national
government").
62. More than two years after his confirmation as Solicitor General, Ted Olson has
neither called for the overruling of any Supreme Court precedents nor declined to defend
the constitutionality of any federal statute. This, of course, is not to say that Olson has not
pursued any socially conservative causes. In May 2002, Olson informed the Supreme
Court of his belief that the Second Amendment protects an individual's right to bear arms
and therefore extends beyond militias. See Tony Mauro, Warning Shots Foretold Gun
Flip: Observers of SG Saw Internal Struggle, LEGAL TIMES, May 13, 2002, at 8. More
generally, in the wake of September 11, 2001, Solicitor General Olson has invested
considerable energy in defending various Bush administration initiatives tied to the
ongoing "War on Terror." See Neil A. Lewis, Loss Shadows Solicitor General's Victories,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2002, at 18.
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